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2. See id. at 966-67, 970.
3. See Frank J. Cavico, Employment at Will and Public Policy, 25 AKRON L. REV. 497,
501-02 (1992).
4. See id.
5. Lorraine K. Phillips, The Legal Chokehold: Professional Employment in Ohio Under
the Employment-At-Will Doctrine, 24 AKRON L. REV. 581, 585 (1991).
6. 1989 OK 22, ¶ 17, 770 P.2d 24, 28.
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cause of action.  See, e.g., Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 1992 OK 72, ¶ 19, 833 P.2d 1218,
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NOTES
A Misguided Reversal: Why the Oklahoma Supreme Court
Should Not Have Interpreted Saint v. Data Exchange, Inc.
to Provide a Burk Tort Cause of Action to Plaintiffs
Alleging Age Discrimination in Employment
I. Introduction
Terminable at-will employment theoretically benefits both the employer and
employee for a number of reasons, but principally because each party has an
equal right to end the employment relationship whenever he or she desires
without facing any legal consequences.   Society also benefits from such an1
employment arrangement by avoiding the litigation that would otherwise result
from the parties’ facing legal liability.   This characterization of employment2
at-will, however, unrealistically assumes that both the employer and employee
have equal power.   Employee power decreases as corporations grow larger3
and job shortages abound.   Yet at-will employment promotes economic4
growth, benefitting not only employers but society at large.  5
In recognition of these competing needs, the Oklahoma Supreme Court, in
Burk v. K-Mart Corp., adopted the public policy exception to employment at-
will.   This exception protects employees who are discharged from their jobs6
in violation of Oklahoma’s public policy, “as articulated by constitutional,
statutory or decisional law,” by affording them a tort cause of action for
wrongful discharge.   At the same time, the court recognized the importance7
of employers’ engaging in efficient business practices by emphasizing the
narrow application of this newly created common law action.   8
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9. 25 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1101-1901 (2001).
10. See, e.g., Collier v. Insignia Fin. Group, 1999 OK 49, 981 P.2d 321; Tate, 1992 OK 72,
833 P.2d 1218.
11. See Clinton v. State ex rel. Logan County Election Bd., 2001 OK 52, ¶ 7, 29 P.3d 543,
546, overruled by Kruchowski v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 2008 OK 105, ¶ 25, 202 P.3d 144, 152.
12. Id. ¶ 9, 29 P.3d at 546.
13. See 1996 OK 1, ¶ 12, 910 P.2d 1011, 1014, overruled by Kruchowski, ¶ 23, 202 P.3d
at 151; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006).  Under the ADEA, a claimant in a civil case (as
opposed to an enforcement action by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC))
may recover unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation, as well as liquidated
damages in cases of willful violations of the Act.  Id. § 626(b).  A court may also grant other
appropriate legal or equitable relief, including orders requiring employment, reinstatement, or
promotion as required to effectuate the purposes of the Act.  Id.  Additionally, absent an EEOC
action, a person bringing a claim under the ADEA is entitled to a jury trial.  Id. § 626(c).
14. Michael W. Bowling, Saint v. Data Exchange: A Sea Change or Business as Usual for
the Public Policy Tort Exception to Employment At-Will?, 78 OKLA. B.J. 137, 138 (2007). 
15. 2006 OK 59, 145 P.3d 1037.
16. See Bowling, supra note 14, at 138 (observing that “the Saint court fail[ed] to mention
either Clinton or List, leaving practitioners to wonder if Saint [was] intended to mark a
fundamental shift by the court away from these prior rulings or to be read alongside and
together with them”).
17. See Saint, ¶ 1, 145 P.3d at 1037.  The certified question read as follows: “Is there either
an implied statutory remedy or a common-law Burk tort remedy for state age discrimination
claims arising under the operation of the Oklahoma Constitution, Art. 5 § 46 and the provisions
Oklahoma courts have looked to the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act
(OADA)  as a basis for the public policy exception in employment9
discrimination cases.   Cases have lacked clarity, however, regarding the10
availability of a Burk tort action when employment discrimination victims
have an adequate federal remedy.   The Oklahoma Supreme Court attempted11
to settle this issue in Clinton v. State ex rel. Logan County Election Board by
holding that an adequate state or federal statutory remedy precluded the
common law action.   In a case decided before Clinton, List v. Anchor Paint12
Manufacturing Co., the Oklahoma Supreme Court had already determined that
age discrimination victims had an adequate federal statutory remedy available
to them under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).13
After List and Clinton, it seemed settled that age discrimination victims
could not bring a Burk tort action because the ADEA provided an adequate
remedy that precluded the common law action.   Then, in 2006, Saint v. Data14
Exchange, Inc.  unnecessarily confused the availability of the Burk tort15
remedy in age discrimination cases.   The Saint court was presented with a16
narrowly worded certified question from the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Oklahoma that specifically asked the court to consider
the availability of a Burk tort action for age discrimination victims under the
Oklahoma Constitution and the state antidiscrimination statute.   The question17
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of the Oklahoma Anti-discrimination Act, 25 O.S. §§ 1101, et seq. and § 1901?”  Id.  
18. See id.
19. Id. ¶ 6, 145 P.3d at 1039. 
20. See, e.g., Bennett v. Head Country Food Prods., Inc., No. CIV-07-1100-D, 2008 WL
3095847, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 4, 2008); Miller v. Love’s Travel Stops & Country Stores,
Inc., No. CIV. 06-1008-D, 2008 WL 1841021, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 21, 2008); see also
Bowling, supra note 14, at 138.
21. 2008 OK 105, 202 P.3d 144.
22. 2009 OK 13, 204 P.3d 75.
23. Kruchowski, ¶ 23, 202 P.3d at 151.
24. Id. ¶ 31, 202 P.3d at 153.
25. Shirazi, ¶ 12, 204 P.3d at 79.
did not ask if the ADEA offered an adequate federal remedy that would
subsequently preclude the Burk tort cause of action.   After providing analysis18
that addressed only the narrow certified question, however, the court
concluded that a Burk tort remedy is available for alleged employment age
discrimination victims as members of the more general class of employment
discrimination victims protected by the OADA.   This overly broad language19
and the opinion’s complete lack of discussion about List and the ADEA as an
adequate, preclusive remedy resulted in confusion about when the Burk tort
remedy was available to age discrimination victims.  20
The Oklahoma Supreme Court later clarified the meaning of the Saint
decision in Kruchowski v. Weyerhaeuser  and Shirazi v. Childtime Learning21
Center, Inc.   Kruchowski expressly overruled List, after explaining that Saint22
had implicitly done so,  and held that a Burk tort cause of action is available23
to an alleged employment discrimination victim when the remedy available to
him or her is “not uniform and evenhanded” with the remedies available to
other members of the OADA’s employment discrimination class.   Shirazi24
subsequently clarified that the same remedies must be available to all members
of the OADA employment discrimination class.25
Although Kruchowski and Shirazi brought certainty to the law by explaining
that the adequacy of a federal remedy is no longer relevant to the question
whether a Burk tort cause of action is available after Saint, the court’s broad
interpretation of Saint in those cases cannot be squared with the narrow
wording of the certified question presented in Saint, applicable Oklahoma
Supreme Court precedent in place at the time Saint was decided, and the
rationale behind the creation of the Burk tort remedy.  This note argues that
relevant precedent and policy considerations lead to the conclusion that a
narrower interpretation of Saint would have been more appropriate.  Part II
provides a description of the public policy exception to employment at-will
and discusses the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s application of the exception in
employment discrimination cases.  Part III outlines the facts of the Saint case
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2010
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26. Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 1989 OK 22, ¶ 5, 770 P.2d 24, 26.
27. Id.
28. See id.
29. See Hall v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 1985 OK 40, ¶ 13, 713 P.2d 1027, 1029.
30. Id.
31. Burk, ¶ 1, 770 P.2d at 25.
32. See id. ¶¶ 3-4, 770 P.2d at 25-26.  The Revised Uniform Certification of Questions of
Law Act authorizes such intercourt inquiries under certain circumstances.  See 20 OKLA. STAT.
§§ 1601-1611 (2001); see also infra text accompanying notes 193-95. 
and explains the court’s rationale for the decision.  Part IV discusses Saint’s
application in the Tenth Circuit before the Oklahoma Supreme Court rendered
Kruchowski and Shirazi and provides a brief description of the effect of those
cases.  Part V argues that the court should not have interpreted the Saint case
as overruling List and providing a Burk tort remedy in all age discrimination
cases because a narrow interpretation of Saint would have been more
consistent with the wording of the certified question, precedent, and the policy
behind the Burk tort remedy.  Part V also explains the circumstances in which
Saint would provide a remedy under a narrow interpretation.  This note
concludes in Part VI.
II. The Law Before Saint v. Data Exchange, Inc.
Oklahoma has historically adhered to the employment at-will doctrine,
which holds that an employment contract without a definite duration is
terminable at the desire of either the employer or employee.   As a practical26
matter, the doctrine allows an employer to discharge an employee for any
reason, good or bad, without incurring liability.   The traditional justification27
for the doctrine is that it serves the twin interests of economic growth and
freedom of contract.  28
A. Burk v. K-Mart Corp.: The Creation of the Public Policy Exception to
the At-Will Employment Doctrine
Despite adherence to the employment at-will doctrine, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court has recognized that freedom of contract is not limitless.   The29
court has stated that the interests of the state’s citizens are not best promoted
by “a marketplace of cut-throat business dealings where the law of the jungle
is thinly clad in contractual lace.”   In Burk v. K-Mart Corp., the plaintiff sued30
her employer under both contract and tort theories, alleging that her employer
had broken the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implicit in their
employment contract.   In response to a question certified from the U.S.31
District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma,  the Oklahoma Supreme32
Court sought to strike an appropriate balance between competing societal
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol62/iss2/4
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33. See Burk, ¶ 16, 770 P.2d at 28.
34. See id. ¶¶ 7, 14, 770 P.2d at 26, 28. 
35. Id. ¶¶ 12, 13, 770 P.2d at 27. 
36. Id. ¶ 17, 770 P.2d at 28.
37. Id.
38. See id. ¶ 18, 770 P.2d at 29.
39. See id. (quoting Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 631 (Haw. 1982)).
40. See id.
41. See 1992 OK 72, 833 P.2d 1218.
42. 25 OKLA. STAT. § 1302 (2001).
43. Tate, ¶ 3, 833 P.2d at 1220-21.
44. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(f)(1) (2006) (authorizing private discrimination claims by
individual employees against their employers under specified conditions).
interests:  the employer’s need for efficient business practices and the
employee’s need to earn a living.   The Burk court thus examined two33
judicially created exceptions to the at-will doctrine: an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing and the public policy exception.   The court34
declined to imply a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in Oklahoma’s
employment contracts, explaining that it would have been “overly broad” to
imply such covenants in terminable at-will employment arrangements.35
Instead, the court recognized a public policy exception to the employment at-
will doctrine.   The exception provides a tort cause of action for an employee36
discharged from employment in violation of a clearly mandated public
policy.   In recognition of employers’ needs, the court stated that the nature37
of the exception must be “tightly circumscribed.”   Therefore, the public38
policy that serves as a basis for the exception must be clearly conveyed by
statutory or constitutional law.   Although the court explained that judicial39
decisions may establish such a policy, it cautioned against declaring a public
policy without any previous legislative or judicial input.40
B. Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc.: The Extension of the Public Policy
Exception to Race Discrimination Victims
In Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., the Oklahoma Supreme Court considered
for the first time the availability of a Burk tort remedy in the context of
employment discrimination and the OADA,  which prohibits employers from41
discharging or otherwise discriminating against employees based on race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or handicap.   Tate, a black male,42
filed two discrimination claims with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC)—one for racial discrimination and another for wrongful
termination following a previous complaint to the EEOC.   Tate subsequently43
sued in federal court, bringing a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act44
as well as a state-law Burk tort claim for compensatory and punitive
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2010
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45. Tate, ¶ 4, 833 P.2d at 1221.
46. Id. ¶ 1, 833 P.2d at 1220.  The certified question asked,
Where an at-will employee terminated by a private employer files suit alleging
facts that, if true, violate state and federal statutes providing remedies for
employment discrimination, can the employee-plaintiff state a tort cause of action
based on the same facts, pursuant to the public policy exception to the at-will
termination rule, recently recognized by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Burk v.
K-Mart, 770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989)? 
Id.  
47. Id. ¶ 6, 833 P.2d at 1222.
48. Id. ¶ 9, 833 P.2d at 1225.
49. Id. ¶ 10, 833 P.2d at 1225.
50. See id. 
51. Id. ¶ 17, 833 P.2d at 1229.
52. Id. ¶ 16, 833 P.2d at 1228; see also 25 OKLA. STAT. § 1502(a) (2001). 
53. Tate, ¶ 16, 833 P.2d at 1229.
54. Id. ¶ 17, 833 P.2d at 1229.
55. Id. ¶ 18, 833 P.2d at 1229-30. 
damages.   The federal court certified to the Oklahoma Supreme Court the45
question whether a Burk tort remedy was available in these circumstances.46
In its response, the Oklahoma Supreme Court first noted that the applicable
federal law, Title VII, does not preempt the relevant state law provisions in the
OADA.   Next, the court considered whether an employee’s racial47
discrimination and retaliatory discharge are actionable under the Burk
exception.   The court answered in the affirmative because an employer’s48
participation in racial discrimination undoubtedly violates Oklahoma’s public
policy against employment discrimination, as clearly articulated by the
OADA.   49
After establishing the existence of the common law claim, the court next
considered the intersection between the tort action and the state statutory
remedy provided by the OADA.   First, the court determined that the state50
legislature did not intend the OADA to be the sole remedy for racial
discrimination victims.   In making this determination, the court examined51
OADA language indicating that an alleged discrimination victim may file a
complaint with the state Human Rights Commission.   The word “may,” the52
court observed, denotes a permissive or discretionary use rather than a
mandatory action.   The court inferred from this language that  the legislature53
did not intend to enter, “much less completely occupy, the entire arena of
legally regulated employer/employee relationship.”   54
Second, the Tate court explained that, because the types of discrimination
victims named in the OADA “comprise a single class,”  disallowing a Burk55
tort claim in racial discrimination cases would violate the Oklahoma
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol62/iss2/4
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56. See OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 46.  
57. Okla. City v. Griffin, 1965 OK 76, ¶ 8, 403 P.2d 463, 465 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Fenimore v. State ex rel. Comm’rs of the Land Office, 1948 OK 93, ¶ 6, 194
P.2d 852, 854).
58. Tate, ¶ 18, 833 P.2d at 1229.  Compare 25 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1302, 1502 (2001)
(authorizing an administrative remedy for all claimants in the employment discrimination class),
with id. § 1901 (authorizing a private right of action for handicap discrimination claimants
only).
59. Tate, ¶ 18, 833 P.2d at 1229-30.
60. Id. ¶ 19, 833 P.2d at 1230.
61. 1996 OK 1, ¶ 1 n.1, 910 P.2d 1011, 1012 n.1, overruled by Kruchowski v.
Weyerhaeuser Co., 2008 OK 105, ¶ 23, 202 P.3d 144, 151.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. Id. ¶ 1, 910 P.2d at 1012.
65. Id. ¶ 5, 910 P.2d at 1013.
Constitution’s prohibition on “special laws” —that is, laws that “apply to less56
than the whole of a class of persons, entities or things standing upon the same
footing or in substantially the same situation or circumstances and hence do
not have a uniform operation.”   This is because the OADA authorizes a57
private right of action for handicap discrimination claimants but not for racial
discrimination claimants.   This disparity, the court reasoned, would result in58
a constitutionally impermissible “dichotomous division of discrimination
remedies,” if the OADA were the only remedy for racial discrimination
victims.   To avoid such a problem, the Tate court ultimately held that racial59
discrimination victims have a common law remedy—the Burk tort cause of
action—available to them under the public policy exception to the employment
at-will doctrine.60
C. List v. Anchor Paint Manufacturing Co.: The Oklahoma Supreme
Court’s Refusal to Extend the Public Policy Exception to Age
Discrimination Victims
In List v. Anchor Paint Manufacturing Co., the plaintiff alleged that he was
demoted from his supervisory position because of his age.   He claimed that61
the resulting working conditions were intolerable and forced him to resign
from his employment.   List brought a Burk tort cause of action in federal62
court, arguing that he was constructively discharged from his employment.63
The federal court certified to the Oklahoma Supreme Court the question
whether Oklahoma recognized a Burk tort claim when a plaintiff alleged that
his employer’s conduct resulted in his constructive discharge.   The Oklahoma64
Supreme Court did not address the question whether the facts of the case met
the requirements for a constructive discharge.   Instead, the List court focused65
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66. See id. ¶ 12, 910 P.2d at 1014.
67. See id. ¶ 6, 910 P.2d at 1013.
68. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2006); see also supra note 13.
69. List, ¶ 11, 910 P.2d 1013-14.
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2006) (setting forth the remedies available in a Title VII
action).
71. See Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 1992 OK 72, ¶ 4 & nn.6-7, 833 P.2d 1218, 1221 &
nn.6-7.
72. List, ¶ 11, 910 P.2d at 1014 (citing, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (1994));
see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
73. See List, ¶ 11, 910 P.2d at 1014.
74. See id. 
75. See id. ¶ 11 & n.3, 910 P.2d at 1014 & n.3 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)-(c) (1994)).
76. Id. ¶ 12, 910 P.2d at 1014.
77. See id. ¶ 16, 910 P.2d at 1015.
78. See id. (quoting 1 LEX K. LARSON, UNJUST DISMISSAL § 6.10[6][e] (1989)).  The court
presented this widening effect as the reason why most jurisdictions do not recognize status-
on the issue of whether the Burk exception to at-will employment extended to
age discrimination cases.   After emphasizing the narrow scope of the public66
policy exception,  the court distinguished between the plaintiff in the instant67
case and the plaintiff in Tate by comparing the remedies provided by the
ADEA,  the applicable federal statute in List,  with those set forth in the Civil68 69
Rights Act of 1964,  the applicable federal statute in Tate.   70 71
The List court observed that the Civil Rights Act did not provide a plaintiff
with the right to a jury trial, and it limited damages available to recovering
victims to back pay.   A plaintiff could not recover any additional72
compensatory or punitive damages under the federal law.   Thus, the Tate73
court found that a Burk tort action was necessary to secure the plaintiff’s right
to a jury trial and to allow for the recovery of damages above back pay.   By74
contrast, the ADEA provides a plaintiff with the right to trial by jury, and the
statute allows a plaintiff to recover “liquidated damages” (i.e., punitive
damages) in an amount equal to actual damages if the employer is found to be
in willful violation of the ADEA.   Accordingly, the court determined that75
List had an adequate federal statutory remedy for his age discrimination claim;
therefore, the Burk exception did not extend to him or any other age
discrimination victims.76
After announcing its holding, the Oklahoma Supreme Court proceeded to
note the questionability of relying on discrimination laws as the basis for the
public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.   Allowing77
common law wrongful discharge actions based on employee status rather than
active conduct would, the court suggested, open the exception to a much wider
field of potential plaintiffs, thereby defeating the effort to keep the exception
narrow.   Moreover, because age discrimination claimants could seek a78
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based wrongful discharge claims.  See id. ¶¶ 15-16, 910 P.2d at 1014.  
79. See id. ¶ 16, 910 P.2d at 1015.
80. 1997 OK 34, ¶ 11, 939 P.2d 1116, 1119, overruled by Kruchowski v. Weyerhaeuser
Co., 2008 OK 105, ¶ 25, 202 P.3d 144, 152.  
81. Id. ¶ 10, 939 P.2d at 1119 (citing 25 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1101-1901 (1991) (OADA); 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. 1992) (Title VII)).
82. Id. ¶ 16, 939 P.2d at 1120.
83. Id. ¶ 23, 939 P.2d at 1122 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994)).
84. Id. ¶ 20, 939 P.2d at 1121. 
85. Id. ¶ 19, 939 P.2d at 1121.
86. Id. ¶ 20, 939 P.2d at 1121. 
greater remedy under the common law, a tort action would discourage such
plaintiffs from utilizing the very statutory remedy (filing a claim with the state
Human Rights Commission or the EEOC) on which the exception was based.79
D. Marshall v. OK Rental & Leasing, Inc.: The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s
Initial Refusal to Extend the Public Policy Exception to Constructively
Discharged Sexual Harassment Victims
In Marshall v. OK Rental & Leasing, Inc., the plaintiff claimed that sexual
harassment at her place of employment caused her to be constructively
discharged from her job because her work environment was so intentionally
hostile that she had no choice but to quit.   The plaintiff brought a Burk tort80
cause of action, claiming that the OADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 articulate a public policy against constructive discharge.   The81
Oklahoma Supreme Court relied heavily on the List decision in holding that
a Burk tort cause of action was not available to the plaintiff, characterizing List
as holding that when an employment discrimination victim had a statutory
remedy that sufficiently protected his or her rights, the common law remedy
was no longer available because the statutory remedy was exclusive.   The82
plaintiff in Marshall had adequate remedy under the OADA and Title VII
because after Tate was decided Congress amended Title VII to provide the
right to a jury trial and compensatory and punitive damages.   The court also83
echoed the criticism in List about using discrimination statutes as a basis for
the public policy exception.   Finally, the Marshall court reiterated not only84
the distinction between an employee’s discharge based on “status” and
discharge based on “conduct,”  but also the concern that providing a tort85
cause of action to discrimination victims would encourage them to ignore the
very statutory remedy that served as the basis for the public policy exception
in the first place.  86
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87. 1999 OK 49, ¶ 1, 981 P.2d 321, 322.
88. Id. ¶ 5, 981 P.2d at 323.
89. Id. ¶ 10, 981 P.2d at 324.
90. Id. ¶ 12, 981 P.2d at 325.
91. See id. 
92. Id. ¶ 13, 981 P.2d at 325.
93. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 25 OKLA. STAT. § 1101 (1991)).  The language of the
statute remains the same in the most recent version of Oklahoma’s official statutory code.  See
25 OKLA. STAT. § 1101 (2001).  
94. Collier, ¶ 13, 981 P.2d at 325.  Under the federal Fair Housing Law, a prevailing
plaintiff may be awarded actual and punitive damages, a temporary or permanent injunction or
temporary restraining order, and such other relief as the court deems appropriate.  42 U.S.C. §
3613(c)(1) (2006).  The prevailing party may be awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs
in the court’s discretion.  Id. § 3613(c)(2). 
95. Collier, ¶ 13, 981 P.2d at 325.
E. Collier v. Insignia Financial Group: The Oklahoma Supreme Court
Reconsiders the Extension of the Public Policy Exception to Constructively
Discharged Sexual Harassment Victims
In Collier v. Insignia Financial Group, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
answered another certified question asking whether a Burk tort remedy is
available to constructively discharged sexual harassment victims.   The court87
restated that an alleged victim has a Burk tort cause of action only after
identifying a clearly articulated public policy goal  and found that88
constructively discharged employees can bring a Burk tort claim provided they
meet the test for constructive discharge as outlined by the court.   The court89
explained, however, that the common law remedy would be available only in
the absence of an adequate statutory remedy.   Therefore, the next step of the90
analysis was to determine whether the OADA provided sexual harassment
victims with an adequate remedy.91
First, the court analyzed the statute’s opening language.   The OADA’s92
stated purpose, the court explained, is to provide for the state’s execution of
“the policies embodied in the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 [and] the
federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 . . . and to provide
rights and remedies substantially equivalent to those granted under the federal
Fair Housing Law.”   According to the court, this language “amply evidences”93
the legislature’s intent for the OADA’s main remedial measures to be those
provided by the Fair Housing Law.   Furthermore, the court observed that the94
legislature distinguished between “policies” and “remedies,” demonstrating
that the drafters understood the difference between the two.   The court95




97. See id. ¶ 14, 981 P.2d at 325-26.
98. Id. 
99. Id. ¶ 14, 981 P.2d at 326.
100. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 55-59.  
101. See Collier, ¶¶ 14-15, 981 P.2d at 326-27.
102. 2001 OK 52, ¶ 10, 29 P.3d 543, 546, overruled by Kruchowski v. Weyerhaeuser Co.,
2008 OK 105, ¶ 25, 202 P.3d 144, 152.
103. Id. ¶ 7, 29 P.3d at 546. 
104. Id.
105. See id. ¶ 1, 29 P.3d at 541.
106. Id. ¶ 8, 29 P.3d at 546.
acts cited in the OADA to provide the only remedies for violations of the
state’s antidiscrimination policy.96
Second, the Collier court emphasized the same state constitutional concerns
raised in Tate.   Despite the fact that the types of discrimination victims97
named in the OADA constitute a single class,  the OADA affords sexual98
harassment victims only an administrative remedy, but allows handicap
discrimination victims a private cause of action.   In light of this disparity, the99
court reasoned that the legislature did not intend the OADA to be the sole
remedy for sexual harassment victims because such a remedial scheme would
give members of the same class of victims different remedies—a result
forbidden by the Oklahoma Constitution.   In sum, the court held that a Burk100
tort action is available to sexual harassment victims because their constructive
discharge violates the state’s public policy goal as clearly articulated by the
OADA and because the statute does not provide victims with an adequate
remedy.101
F. Clinton v. Logan County Election Board: The Oklahoma Supreme Court
Clarifies the Availability of the Burk Tort Cause of Action to
Discrimination Victims
In Clinton v. Logan County Election Board, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
set out to clarify the boundaries of the Burk tort cause of action.   The102
plaintiff, an alleged victim of gender discrimination, argued that the existence
of an adequate federal statutory remedy did not affect the availability of the
common law action.   The Collier court’s silence on the issue, together with103
the List and Marshall decisions, had resulted in uncertainty about the
availability of the tort action.   The Clinton opinion—occasioned by yet104
another question certified from one of the federal district courts within
Oklahoma —answered the question “head-on.”   The court explained that105 106
the purpose behind the creation of the Burk tort action was to discourage
employers from terminating an at-will employee for a reason that violates the
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state’s clearly articulated public policy.   Accordingly, the court stated, the107
state common law action was unnecessary when a statute adequately protected
Oklahoma’s public policy.   The court reasoned that although a federal108
statute does not serve as a statement of the state’s public policy goals, a federal
statutory remedy may effectively discourage at-will employers from
terminating their employees for reasons that violate the state’s public policy.109
Therefore, the court held that the existence of a federal statutory remedy that
adequately protected the state’s public policy precluded an independent Burk
tort action.   Although the List and Marshall cases differentiated between110
status-based and conduct-based wrongful terminations,  the court explained111
that those cases were primarily decided on the basis that both plaintiffs had
adequate statutory remedies for their alleged wrongful terminations.   112
Thus, the Clinton and List cases seemed to establish that a Burk tort cause
of action was not available to age discrimination victims because the federal
ADEA supplied an adequate, preclusive remedy.  Nevertheless, the Clinton
court’s goal of clarifying the law on this issue was thwarted five years later by
the Saint decision.
III. Saint v. Data Exchange, Inc.: Statement of the Case
A. Facts and Procedure
Fifty-eight-year-old Carol Saint, the plaintiff in the case, maintained that her
employer, Data Exchange, Inc., had terminated her employment because of her
age.   The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s opinion provides no other details113
regarding the circumstances of her employment or of the termination.  Saint
brought her case in federal court, asserting claims under the federal ADEA and
the state’s public policy against age discrimination, as articulated by the
OADA.   The plaintiff claimed that the OADA creates a unified class of114
discrimination victims—made up of handicap, race, gender, and age
discrimination victims—and that article 5, section 46 of the Oklahoma
Constitution requires equal remedies for the unified class.   Saint asserted115
that the state and federal statutory remedies for age discrimination victims
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117. See Saint, ¶ 2, 145 P.3d at 1037-38.
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119. Id. ¶ 1, 145 P.3d at 1037.
120. Id.
121. See id., 2006 OK 59, 145 P.3d 1037.
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were inferior to the Oklahoma statutory remedy for handicap discrimination
victims.   Therefore, Saint argued, the statutory remedies for age116
discrimination victims were constitutionally inadequate, and she could recover
under the Burk tort cause of action.117
The defendant moved to dismiss the state common law claim, maintaining
that the ADEA provided the plaintiff with an adequate federal remedy and
thereby precluded the state common law action.   The United States District118
Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma certified the following question
to the Oklahoma Supreme Court: “Is there either an implied statutory remedy
or a common-law Burk tort remedy for state age discrimination claims arising
under the operation of the Oklahoma Constitution, Art. 5 § 46 and the
provisions of the Oklahoma Anti-discrimination Act, 25 O.S. §§ 1101, et seq.
and § 1901?”   The court answered yes.119 120
B. The Court’s Rationale
The Oklahoma Supreme Court answered the federal court’s certified
question in a short, six-paragraph opinion written by Justice Hargrave.121
Without delivering separate opinions, seven justices concurred and one justice
concurred in the result.   The Saint opinion characterized the certified122
question as the “self-same question” already addressed in the Tate and Collier
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cases regarding racial discrimination and sexual harassment victims,
respectively.   The Saint court repeated Tate’s and Collier’s observation that123
the discrimination victims named in the OADA constitute a single class  and124
that failing to provide equal remedies to all members of the class would create
a “dichotomous division of members of the same class.”   Such a division,125
the court reiterated, would offend article 5, section 46 of the Oklahoma
Constitution, which mandates “norms of uniformity, symmetry and
evenhanded treatment.”  126
The court then quoted the Collier case’s comparison of the OADA’s
remedies for handicap discrimination victims with the statute’s remedies for
sexual harassment victims.   Recalling that a Burk tort action provides127
terminated sexual harassment victims with a private cause of action
“comparable to that statutorily accorded to victims of handicap
discrimination,”  the court recognized Collier as having avoided the “pitfalls128
of according asymmetrical remedies to members of a single class of
employment discrimination victims” by holding that the OADA is not the
exclusive remedy available to sexual harassment victims.   The court129
emphasized, however, that if the OADA had given sexual harassment and
handicap discrimination victims the same remedy, the common law action
would have been disallowed.  130
The Saint court also revisited the Tate case’s discussion comparing the
OADA’s remedies for handicap discrimination victims with the remedies for
race discrimination victims,  underscoring once again that under the OADA,131
handicap discrimination victims have a private cause of action, but a similar
cause of action is not available to race discrimination victims.   As a result,132
the court explained, if the OADA were the sole remedy for race discrimination
victims, “[t]here would be a more generous remedy for victims of handicap
discrimination than for those who suffered from racial discrimination.”   But,133
as the court pointed out, the Oklahoma Constitution “absolutely interdicts”
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passing laws that provide unequal remedies for those who allege employment
discrimination.  134
Only in the last paragraph of the Saint case, after quoting the Tate and
Collier decisions at length, did the court specifically address age
discrimination victims.   Without discussion, the Saint court summarily135
concluded that “[a]ge-discrimination victims are part of the employment
discrimination class, and as such must be afforded the same rights as the other
members of the class.  Therefore we find that there is a Burk tort remedy for
those who allege employment age discrimination.”   The Saint opinion did136
not expressly address the defendant’s claim that the federal ADEA was an
adequate statutory remedy that precluded the Burk tort claim.   The opinion137
also failed to acknowledge the apparent conflict with the Oklahoma Supreme
Court’s prior holdings in the List and Clinton cases.138
IV. Saint’s Impact and the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s Later Clarification
of the Case
Before the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided Saint, courts typically
dismissed employees’ state common law age discrimination claims when
employees also filed analogous federal claims.   These dismissals were based139
on List’s holding that age discrimination victims did not have a Burk tort
remedy available to them because the federal ADEA provided an adequate
remedy.   Moreover, Clinton had affirmed that the existence of an adequate140
federal remedy would preclude Burk tort claims generally.   Not surprisingly,141
then, following the Saint decision, interested entities filed a “flurry of amicus
briefs” calling for the court to reconsider and reverse the case.   Yet on142
September 18, 2006, all of the justices on the Oklahoma Supreme Court
concurred in denying a rehearing.143
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A. Uncertainty Following the Saint Decision
The Saint opinion broadly announced that “there is a Burk tort remedy for
those who allege employment age discrimination,”  but the court’s failure to144
discuss either the ADEA’s adequacy as a federal remedy or the List case
created uncertainty about whether the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s previous
precedents, which had unquestionably been viewed and applied by other courts
to preclude state common law claims in federal employment age
discrimination cases, remained valid.   One federal judge characterized the145
post-Saint judicial task as an “attempt[ ] in various ways either to reconcile the
Oklahoma Supreme Court’s employment law decisions or to manage federal
cases involving Burk claims until the uncertainty [was] resolved.”146
In view of this uncertainty among the courts, plaintiffs argued that the Saint
case was meant to overrule the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s previous decisions
in Clinton and List and that plaintiffs alleging employment discrimination
under the ADEA were no longer precluded from bringing an additional state
common law action.   Such an interpretation of Saint benefits plaintiffs147
because a Burk tort claim allows them to seek compensatory and punitive
damages that would be unavailable if the ADEA provided their sole remedy.148
Defendants countered that the Saint court’s lack of discussion about the ADEA
and the List case demonstrated that the court did not intend to change this area
of employment litigation and that the federal ADEA continued to preclude
plaintiffs’ state common law claims.149
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the plaintiffs’ view of the Saint
ruling in two unpublished decisions, Ruleford v. Tulsa World Publishing Co.150
and Enderwood v. Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc.   In Ruleford, the court,151
without elaboration, interpreted Saint as holding that the ADEA is an
inadequate federal remedy for age discrimination victims; therefore, the court
concluded that plaintiffs could bring both ADEA and OADA claims together
after Saint.   The Enderwood opinion interpreted Saint as abrogating the152
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Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision in List without explaining the reason for
this interpretation.   153
In Miller v. Love’s Travel Stops & Country Stores, Inc., Judge DeGiusti of
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma followed the
Tenth Circuit’s view of the Saint opinion, agreeing with this “common-sense
reading of Saint, at least as it impacts age discrimination claims.”   Judge154
DeGiusti explained that “[b]ecause a ‘federal court must defer to the most
recent decisions of the state’s highest court,’ this Court will follow Saint and
the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision to provide a Burk remedy in an
ADEA case.”   Similarly, in Boyles v. AG Equipment Co., Judge Kern of the155
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma decided to follow
suit and allow a plaintiff to bring a state common law claim with an ADEA
claim.   Judge Kern noted, however, that there was some question about156
whether the Saint case overruled the List decision or instead reached only the
question of the OADA’s adequacy as a state remedy for age discrimination
victims.157
Not all judges adopted the plaintiffs’ interpretation of Saint.  In an order
granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim in the
case of Peery v. Veolia Water North America-West, LLC, Judge Heaton of the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma discussed the
Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decisions in List, Marshall, Collier, Clinton, and
Tate.   Because of these precedents, Judge Heaton avoided the conclusion158
that the Saint case’s silence regarding the adequacy of the ADEA as a federal
remedy was intended to overrule List, Marshall, and Clinton in “what [was]
otherwise a summary opinion answering a relatively narrow certified
question.”   Judge Heaton reasoned that in previous cases discussing the159
availability of a Burk tort claim, such as Collier, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
had sometimes not discussed the adequacy of federal remedies in its opinions,
but in later cases, such as Clinton, the court had clarified that the adequacy
issue remained a component of the analysis.   160
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Before concluding the order, Judge Heaton explained that the availability
of the Burk tort remedy had become a murky area of employment litigation
and that he was “unable to identify a unifying principle or coordinated series
of principles in the existing authorities which would provide a definitive guide
to the questions presented in this case.”   In light of this lack of clarity in the161
law, Judge Heaton took the position that the implications of Saint were “more
limited” than the plaintiff maintained.   The judge “st[ood] alone” in his162
decision not to allow plaintiffs to bring both a Burk tort claim and a federal
claim under the ADEA after Saint.  163
Thus, in the wake of the Saint decision, the district court in which a case
was filed and the judge assigned to the case were the decisive factors with
regard to whether a plaintiff could file both a Burk tort claim and a claim under
the ADEA.  This variation in law throughout Oklahoma’s federal courts
showed that the Saint case had confused this once-settled area of employment
litigation.
B. The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s Clarification of the Saint Decision in
Kruchowski and Shirazi
The Oklahoma Supreme Court took the opportunity to clarify the confusion
created by Saint in Kruchowski v. Weyerhaeuser Co.   In response to a164
question certified from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Oklahoma, the Kruchowski court explained that the Saint court meant to
include age discrimination victims in the class of employment discrimination
victims to which the Burk tort remedy is available and that Saint had thereby
implicitly overruled List.   Thus, Kruchowski held that an alleged165
employment discrimination victim may bring a Burk tort claim when the
remedies available to him are “not uniform and evenhanded” with the remedies
available to the other members of the class of employment discrimination
victims set out in the OADA.   This rule applies, the court continued,166
“regardless of whether the remedies originate under Federal or State law.”167
Therefore, the court explained, in order to bring a Burk tort claim, a plaintiff
must show that an employer violated Oklahoma’s public policy against
employment discrimination and either that no statutory remedy is available or
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that the existing statutory remedy is “not commensurate” with the remedies
available for similar employment-related discrimination.   The Kruchowski168
court also expressly overruled List, as well as Marshall and Clinton to the
extent that they conflict with Kruchowski and Saint.   This ruling garnered169
the votes of eight of nine justices.170
Despite the justices’ near-unanimous opinion in Kruchowski, judges and
attorneys remained uncertain about the application of the Kruchowski and
Saint holdings.   Once again, the Oklahoma Supreme Court was presented171
with the opportunity to dispel any lingering uncertainty when it responded to
a certified question from the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma in Shirazi v. Childtime Learning Center, Inc.   The plaintiff in172
Shirazi argued that identical remedies must be available to all members of the
OADA discrimination class.   The defendant contended that the plaintiff173
must still show the inadequacy of the available federal remedy to bring a Burk
tort claim.   The court agreed with the plaintiff, explaining that the adequacy174
of a federal employment discrimination remedy is no longer the focus of the
Burk tort analysis.   The court stated that a Burk tort remedy is available175
when the applicable statutory remedy is not the same as the remedy provided
to other members of the employment discrimination class identified in the
OADA.176
V. Analysis
The confusion over the availability of the Burk tort remedy that the federal
courts and Oklahoma practitioners experienced in the wake of Saint v. Data
Exchange, Inc. was justified.  On its face, the Saint case’s broad holding
appeared to affirmatively grant a Burk tort remedy to victims of age
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discrimination in employment.   The seemingly straightforward opinion was177
complicated, however, by its failure to mention the List and Clinton cases even
though Saint appeared to directly conflict with those prior decisions.   Saint178
needed explanation, and a careful reading of the precedent in place at the time
the case was rendered would have allowed Saint, List, and Clinton to stand
together.   This reconciliation would have made sense because the Saint and179
Clinton cases were signed by four of the same justices and decided just five
years apart.   The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Kruchowski and Shirazi,180
however, broadly interpreted Saint as overruling List and providing plaintiffs
alleging employment age discrimination with a Burk tort cause of action.181
As argued below, the court should have narrowly interpreted Saint as
preserving List and not addressing the issue of whether the ADEA supplies an
adequate federal remedy.  Such an interpretation would have been more
consistent with the narrowness of the certified question that the Saint court
purported to answer, precedent, and the policy behind the creation of the Burk
tort remedy.  Furthermore, even interpreted narrowly, Saint would have been
a significant case because of its application in situations where the ADEA does
not provide victims of age discrimination in employment with a remedy.
A. The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s Broad Interpretation of Saint Was
Unjustified in Light of the Narrow Question Certified to the Court and
Prior Case Law
The certified question in Saint asked whether there is a Burk tort remedy for
age discrimination victims “arising under the operation of the Oklahoma
Constitution, Art. 5 § 46 and the provisions of the Oklahoma Anti-
discrimination Act.”   On its face, the question appeared to inquire only182
about the availability of a Burk tort cause of action under the Oklahoma
Constitution and the OADA.  Moreover, the Saint opinion characterized the
federal court’s certified question as the “self-same question” answered in the
Tate case regarding racial discrimination victims and in the Collier decision
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regarding victims of sexual harassment.   This characterization shows that the183
Saint court intended to address only the issues found in Tate and Collier.184
In both Tate and Collier, after finding an explicit public policy goal on
which to base the Burk tort claim, the court considered whether there was an
adequate statutory remedy available to the alleged victims that would preclude
the state common law claim.   The Tate and Collier opinions, however,185
analyzed only whether the discrimination victims were afforded adequate
remedies under state statutory law, specifically, the OADA.   Neither opinion186
discussed the adequacy or potential preclusive effect of federal statutory
remedies.   187
Considering the narrow language of the certified question and the Saint
court’s explicit statement that it was answering the same question presented
in Tate and Collier, it seems clear that the court meant to address only the
availability of a Burk tort remedy as a function of the Oklahoma Constitution
and the OADA.  This is particularly true in light of the fact that the Saint court
did not even respond to the defendant’s argument that the federal ADEA
precluded the state common law tort action.   The Oklahoma Supreme Court188
had already considered the issue of whether the ADEA precludes a Burk tort
claim in the List case.   There, the court held that a Burk tort action was not189
necessary for age discrimination victims because the ADEA provided an
adequate remedy.   Moreover, in Clinton, the Oklahoma Supreme Court190
made explicit that the existence of an adequate federal remedy would preclude
a Burk tort claim.191
Given the seemingly settled state of the law, the fact that the Saint court did
not address the existence or implications of an adequate federal remedy should
not have been interpreted to mean that the remedy provided by the ADEA was
inadequate.  Rather, this shows that the issue simply was not raised by the
narrow certified question presented to the court.  Therefore, the Saint case
should not have been broadly interpreted as abrogating the List decision
because the two cases did not address the same issues.  This conclusion is
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buttressed by the fact that the author of the List decision, Justice Watt,
concurred in Saint.192
That the Saint opinion was rendered to answer a certified question of law
also points to the conclusion that the Oklahoma Supreme Court did not intend
to reach the issue of whether the federal ADEA precludes a Burk tort action.
The Revised Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act (Certified
Question Act)  gives the Oklahoma Supreme Court the authority to answer193
a question asked by a U.S. district court if the certified question is
determinative of an issue pending in litigation.   The Certified Question Act194
also specifies, however, that there must be no controlling Oklahoma Supreme
Court decision (or statutory or constitutional provision) on the issue.195
Because the Clinton and List decisions directly controlled the issue of
whether an adequate federal statutory remedy precludes a Burk tort claim,196
the Saint court could not have intended to address that particular issue.
Otherwise, the court would have lacked the authority to answer the federal
court’s question under the Certified Question Act.  Accordingly, the Saint
decision should have been interpreted as reaching only the same issue
addressed in the Collier and Tate cases regarding the OADA’s intersection
with the Oklahoma Constitution.   There was no controlling Oklahoma197
Supreme Court decision on this issue because the intersection between the
OADA and the state constitution had never been explicitly considered in the
context of age discrimination cases.
B. Increasing the Availability of the Burk Tort Remedy Is Inconsistent with
Its Rationale
The view that the Saint case did not abrogate the List decision is more
consistent with the reasoning behind the creation of the Burk tort remedy than
is the view adopted by the court in Kruchowski and Shirazi.  The Oklahoma
Supreme Court adopted the public policy exception to the terminable at-will
doctrine in Burk v. K-Mart Corp.   Despite the fact that the plaintiff initially198
brought a breach of contract claim alleging that her employer had broken the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing implicit in their employment
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contract,  the court declined to impose a duty of good faith and fair dealing199
in Oklahoma’s employment at-will contracts because it would have been
“overly broad” to impose such duties in employment at-will arrangements.200
Rather than implementing the sweeping requirements of good faith and fair
dealing, the Burk court created a common law action that would apply in a
“narrow class of cases.”  201
The court’s decision to eschew a broad implied covenant in favor of a
common law tort action highlights the fact that the court intended the Burk tort
remedy to be available only in limited circumstances.  The court explained that
this new tort action was created in recognition of the necessary balance
between the employer’s needs of efficiency and profitability, the employee’s
need to earn a salary, and society’s goals.   The Burk tort exception to202
employment at-will was meant to protect at-will employees against
“unchecked employer power”  and to dissuade employers from discharging203
employees for reasons that violate Oklahoma’s clearly articulated public
policy.   Out of deference to employers’ needs, however, the Burk opinion204
emphasized that the tort cause of action was supposed to be a narrow
exception to the employment at-will doctrine that would be kept “tightly
circumscribed.”   The Oklahoma Supreme Court has repeated this language205
multiple times in later decisions.206
The above rationale for extending a common law remedy to victims of
employment discrimination generally is not as compelling in the context of
plaintiffs who allege age discrimination because the ADEA already protects
them and provides them with a meaningful remedy.   The availability of this207
federal remedy curtails employer power by ensuring that such power is not
“unchecked” and protects Oklahoma’s public policy against age discrimination
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2010
352 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  62:329
208. See Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act, 25 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1101, 1302, 1505 (2001).
209. See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
210. See Michael D. Moberly, Proceeding Geometrically: Rethinking Parallel State and
Federal Employment Discrimination Litigation, 18 WHITTIER L. REV. 499, 501-04 (1997).
211. See List v. Anchor Paint Mfg. Co., 1996 OK 1, ¶ 12, 910 P.2d 1011, 1014, overruled
by Kruchowski, ¶ 23, 202 P.3d at 151; see also supra text accompanying note 76.  
212. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2006); see also Hammons, supra note 116, at 143.
213. 25 OKLA. STAT. § 1301(1) (2001); see also Hammons, supra note 11, at 143. 
by discouraging employers from engaging in discriminatory conduct.208
Consequently, the Burk tort remedy that was intended to have a narrow
application is unnecessary in situations where the ADEA applies.
Furthermore, allowing a federal statutory remedy under the ADEA and a Burk
tort remedy for the same alleged offensive conduct could disturb the balance
between employer and employee that the Oklahoma Supreme Court has strived
to achieve.   Providing these multiple remedies dissuades employers from209
executing lawful and economically necessary terminations because such
terminations might be construed as age discrimination and could subject
employers to more time-intensive and expensive litigation if employees bring
two different claims, each with potentially complicated remedial schemes.210
C. Even Interpreted Narrowly, Saint Would Provide a Remedy in Several
Cases
Even though the federal ADEA would preclude a state common law action
under the List decision in many age discrimination cases if the Oklahoma
Supreme Court had interpreted Saint narrowly and left List intact,  such an211
interpretation would not have rendered the Saint holding meaningless.  In the
event that an age discrimination victim or her employer did not fall under the
ADEA’s provisions, the Saint case would provide the victim with a Burk tort
cause of action as a function of article 5, section 46 of the Oklahoma
Constitution and the OADA.  For example, the ADEA defines the term
“employer” as a person who has twenty or more daily employees for at least
twenty weeks of a given calendar year (or the previous year).   Therefore, the212
federal remedy would not be available to an age discrimination victim working
for someone with nineteen or fewer employees, or with twenty or more
employees but for less than twenty weeks of the year, because such a person
would not be an “employer” under the ADEA’s definition.  With the federal
remedy unavailable, the Saint decision would come into play, protecting the
alleged age discrimination victim by providing a state common law action.
It is important to note that under the OADA, an “employer” is defined as a
person with fifteen or more employees for twenty or more weeks of the year.213
At the time Saint was decided, Brown v. Ford held that a plaintiff could not
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bring a Burk tort action against a person with fewer than fifteen employees
because such a person is not an “employer” under the OADA.   Thus,214
interpreted narrowly, Saint would have provided a Burk tort cause of action
only in cases where an employer fell in the “gap” between the OADA and
ADEA, that is, when an employer had fifteen or more but fewer than twenty
employees.  215
On November 10, 2009, however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided
Smith v. Pioneer Masonry, Inc.   The Smith court overruled Brown, holding216
that a common law Burk tort cause of action is available to members of the
OADA’s class of discrimination victims irrespective of the number of
employees under their employers’ hire.   Thus, after Smith, a narrow217
interpretation of Saint would provide a Burk tort cause of action against any
employer with fewer than twenty employees, and the ADEA would continue
to provide a cause of action against those with twenty or more employees.218
For the first quarter of 2008, 87.3% of private employment establishments in
Oklahoma had fewer than twenty employees.   Therefore, interpreted219
narrowly, Saint would provide a Burk tort cause of action to any alleged
discrimination victims working for the overwhelming percentage of
Oklahoma’s employers who are not governed by the ADEA.  
The Kruchowski and Shirazi decisions were beneficial in the sense that they
clarified the Saint case to ensure that plaintiffs’ potential recovery and
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defendants’ potential liability no longer vary according to the federal district
in which a case is brought or the judge assigned to the case.   The method220
that the court used to reach this result, however, was flawed.  The court could
have achieved the certainty created by Kruchowski and Shirazi while
maintaining consistency with its previous jurisprudence by interpreting the
Saint opinion as preserving List and recognizing that Saint did not reach the
issue of whether the federal ADEA provides Oklahoma’s age discrimination
victims with an adequate remedy.   This interpretation would have been more221
consistent with the wording of the certified question that Saint purported to
answer, Oklahoma’s prior case law, and the rationale behind the creation of the
Burk tort remedy.   Furthermore, even under a narrow interpretation, Saint222
would serve an important purpose because it would provide a Burk tort cause
of action to alleged age discrimination victims who cannot bring claims under
the ADEA.   223
VI. Conclusion
The Burk tort exception to terminable at-will employment provides a cause
of action for employees who have been discharged from their jobs for reasons
that violate Oklahoma’s clearly articulated public policy.   The OADA224
articulates the state’s public policy against discrimination in employment,
recognizing a unified class of victims—including age, handicap, sex, and
racial discrimination victims—who must be provided with equal remedies.225
The Burk tort cause of action used to be available only in the absence of an
adequate statutory remedy, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court had determined
that the OADA itself does not provide an adequate remedial scheme for race
and sex discrimination victims.   In the List case, however, the Oklahoma226
Supreme Court determined that the federal ADEA supplied an adequate
remedy for age discrimination victims,  and the Clinton case reaffirmed that227
an adequate federal remedy for discrimination victims would preclude a Burk
tort action.   Thus, the law seemed clear that an alleged age discrimination228
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victim could not simultaneously bring a Burk tort claim and a claim under the
ADEA.229
In Saint v. Data Exchange, Inc., however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
answered a certified question asking whether there is a Burk tort cause of
action for age discrimination victims as a function of the Oklahoma
Constitution and the OADA.   The Saint court discussed and cited cases230
relevant only to that specific issue,  but ultimately concluded by stating,231
without qualification, that a Burk tort remedy is available to victims of age
discrimination in employment.   As a result of this broad statement, the Saint232
opinion obscured the law on this issue.   Federal courts in Oklahoma233
struggled to determine whether the Saint case was meant to overrule the
Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision in List or instead did not even reach the
issue of the adequacy of the federal ADEA’s remedy for Oklahoma’s age
discrimination victims.234
The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s Kruchowski and Shirazi opinions
attempted to bring certainty to this murky area of law.   The court stated in235
Kruchowski that Saint had implicitly overruled List.   In Shirazi, the court236
held that in order for an employment discrimination victim to bring a Burk tort
claim, she must show that the statutory remedy available to her is not the same
as the remedy available to other members of the OADA employment
discrimination class.   Alleged victims of employment discrimination,237
therefore, no longer need to show that the statutory remedy available to them
is inadequate.  They need to show merely that it is not the same remedy
available to others in the class.   The Kruchowski and Shirazi decisions were238
helpful because they clarified this area of law; however, the court’s broad
interpretation of Saint was mistaken, and this clarity could have been achieved
by interpreting Saint more narrowly.  Interpreting Saint to avoid a conflict with
List—in other words, finding that Saint did not even reach the issue of the
ADEA’s adequacy or preclusive effect —would have been more consistent239
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with the narrow question that the Saint court was supposed to answer,
precedent, and the rationale behind the creation of the Burk tort remedy.240
Moreover, the Saint case would not have been rendered meaningless by this
interpretation because the decision would still provide a Burk tort remedy to
the significant number of age discrimination victims who cannot bring actions
under the ADEA.241
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